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The Internet of Things: A Security Point of View  
 
Abstract: 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is believed the next wave of innovation that promises to 
create and improve intelligent applications based on intelligent sensing and networking 
technologies. This paper gives an overview of the security requirements in IoT, 
specifically security requirements and solutions are analysed based on a four-layer 
framework of IoT. This paper gives an in-depth review of the security requirements on 
sensing layer, network layer, service layer, and application layer. We then review the 
security solution in enabling technologies in IoT. The security challenges posed by IoT 
applications are also discussed. A main contribution of this paper is that it summarizes 
the current security requirements for each layer of IoT. 
Keyword: Internet of Things, Security Requirements, Multi-layer Security Architecture 
1 Introduction  
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) is believed the next generation of the Internet 
and will become an attractive target for hackers [60], in which billions things are 
interconnected. Each physical object in the IoT is able to interact without human 
intervention [62]. In recent years, a variety of applications with different infrastructures 
have been developed already, such as logistics, manufacturing, healthcare, industrial 
surveillance, etc [23, 43]. A number of cute-edging techniques (such as intelligent 
sensors, wireless communication, networks, data analysis technologies, cloud 
computing, etc.) have been developed to realise the potential of IoT with different 
intelligent systems [62, 63]. However, technologies for the IoT are at their infant stages 
and a lot of technical difficulties associated with IoT need to overcome [61].  One of the 
most significant obstacles in IoT is security [61], which involves the sensing 
infrastructure security, communication network security, application security, and 
  
general system security [65]. To address the security challenges in IoT, we will analyse 
the security problems in IoT based on a four-layer architecture.  
1.1 Overview  
The concept of IoT was firstly proposed in 1999 [61]. However, the exact definition is 
still rather fuzzy and subjective to the perspectives taken [61, 19, 23, 43]. The IoT is 
believed the new generation things’ Internet, which integrates a variety of range of 
technologies, such as sensory, communication, networking, service-oriented 
architecture, and intelligent information processing technologies [61, 29, 36]. However, 
it also brings a number of significant challenges, such as security, integration of hybrid 
networks, intelligent sensing technologies, etc. Security is the chief among them, which 
play a fundamental role to protect the IoT against attacks and malfunctions [60].  
Traditionally, the security means cryptography, secure communication, and privacy 
assurances. However in IoT security encompasses a wide range of tasks, including data 
confidentiality, services availability, integrity, anti-malware, information integrity, 
privacy protection, access control, etc [65].   
As an open eco-system, the IoT security is orthogonal to other research areas.  The great 
diversity of IoT makes it very vulnerable to attacks against availability, service 
integrity, security and privacy. At the lower layer of IoT (sensing layer), the sensing 
devices/technologies have very limited computation capacity and energy supply and 
cannot provide well security protection; at the middle layers (such as network layer, 
service layer), the IoT relies on networking and communications which facilitates 
eavesdropping, interception and DoS attacks. For example, in network layer, a self-
organized topology without centralized control is prone to attacks against 
authentication, such as node replication, node suppression, node impersonation, etc. At 
the upper layer (such as application layer), the data aggregation and encryption turn out 
  
to be useful to mitigate the scalability and vulnerability problems of all layers. To build 
a trust IoT, a system-level security analytics and self-adaptive security policy 
framework are needed. 
1.2 State-of-the-art 
The IoT is an extension of the Internet by integrating mobile networks, Internet, social 
networks, and intelligent things to provide better services or applications to users [68-
79]. The success of IoT depends on the standardization, which provides secured 
interoperability, compatibility, reliability, and effectiveness of the operations on a 
global scale [61]. The importance of IoT has been recognized on a high level on 
national strategies of many countries. In UK, a £5m project on IoT foundation in 
technology and innovation has been launched [9, 28]. The IoT European Research 
Cluster (IERC) sponsored a number of IoT fundamental research projects: IoT-A was 
launched to design a reference model and architecture for IoT, while the ongoing 
RERUM project focuses on IoT security, etc. [11, 14, 49]. The Japan government 
propose ‘u/i-Japan’ strategies. In US, the ITIF focuses on new information and 
communication technologies for IoT [51, 52].  The South Korea conducted RFID/USN 
and “New IT Strategy” program to advance the IoT infrastructure development [52]. 
The China government officially launched the ‘Sensing China’ programme in 2010 
[62].  
Technically, a very diverse range of networking and communication 
technologies is available for IoT, such as WiFi, ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4), BLE (Low 
energy Bluetooth), ANT, etc. More specifically, the IETF has standardized 6LoWPAN 
(IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks), ROLL (routing over low-
power and lossy-networks), and CoAP (constrained application protocol) to equip 
constrained devices [71-89].  Concerns over the authenticity of software and protection 
  
of intellectual property gave rise to various software verification and attestation 
techniques often referred to as trusted or measured boot. The confidentiality of data has 
always been and remains a primary concern. Security control mechanisms have been 
developed to ensure the security of data transmission in wireless communication and in 
motion, such as 802.11i (WPA2) or 802.1AE (MACsec). In recent, the security 
standards for the RFID market have been reported in [67]. For RFID applications, EC 
has released several recommendations to outline the following security issues in a 
lawful, ethical, socially and politically acceptable way [67, 87-94]: 
 Measuring the deployment of RFID applications to ensure that national 
legislation is complying with the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46, 99/5 and 
2002/58.  
 A framework for privacy and data protection impact assessments has been 
proposed (PIA; No.4). 
 Assessment of implications of the application implementation for the protection 
of personal data and privacy (No.5). 
 Identifying any applications that might raise information security threats.  
 Checking the information  
 Issuing recommendations that concern the privacy information and transparency 
on RFID use. 
But for IoT, the security problem still is a challenging area. Billions of devices might be 
connected in IoT and a well-designed security architecture is needed to fully protect the 
information and allow to be securely shared. New security challenges will be created by 
the endless variety of IoT applications. For example,  
 Industrial security concerns, including the intelligent sensors, embedded 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), robotic systems, which are typically 
  
integrated with IoT infrastructure. Security control on the IoT industrial 
infrastructure is a big concern. 
 Hybrid system security controls. The IoT might involve many hybrid systems, 
how to provide cross-system security protection is crucial for the success of the 
IoT. 
 For the new business processes created in IoT, a security is needed to protect the 
business information and data.   
 IoT end-node security, how the end-nodes receive software updates or security 
patches in a timely manner without impairing functional safety is a challenging.  
1.3 Security Requirements 
In IoT, each connected device could be a potential doorway into the IoT infrastructure 
or personal data [87, 88]. The data security and privacy concerns are very important but 
the potential risks associated with the IoT will reach new levels as interoperability, 
mashups and autonomous decision-making begin to embed complexity, security 
loopholes and potential vulnerability. Privacy risks will arise in the IoT since the 
complexity may create more vulnerability that related to the service. In IoT, much 
information is related with our personal information, such as date of birth, location, 
budegets, etc. This is one aspect of the big data challenging, and security professions 
will need to ensure that they think through the potential privacy risks associated with 
the entire data set. The IoT should be implemented in a lawful, ethical, socially and 
politically acceptable way, where legal challenges, systematic approaches, technical 
challenges, and business challenges should be considered. This paper focuses on the 
technically implementation design of the security IoT architecture. Security must be 
addressed throughout the IoT lifecycle from the initial design to the services running.  
  
The main research challenges in IoT scenario include the data confidentiality, privacy, 
and trust, as shown in Fig.1 [37, 90-94]. 
 
Fig.1 Security issues in IoT 
To well illustrate the security requirements in IoT, we modelled the IoT as four-layer 
architecture: sensing-layer, network-layer, service-layer, and application-interface 
layer. Each layer is able to provide corresponding security controls, such as access 
control, device authentication, data integrity and confidentiality in transmission, 
availability, and the ability to anti-virus or attacks. In Table.1, the most security 
concerns in IoT are summarized: 
Table 1 Top ten vulnerabilities in IoT 
Security concerns Interface Layer Service layer Network layer Sensing layer 
Insecure web interface      
Insufficient 
authentication/authorization  
    
Insecure Network services     
Lack of transport encryption     
Privacy concerns     
Insecure Cloud interface     
Insecure Mobile interface     
Insecure Security configuration     
Insecure software/firmware     
Poor physical security     
 
The security requirements depend on each particularly sensing technology, networks, 
layers, and have been identified in the corresponding sections.  
  
2 Security Requirements in IoT Architecture 
A critical requirement of IoT is that the devices must be inter-connected, which makes it 
be able to perform specific tasks, such as sensing, communicating, information 
processing, etc. The IoT is able to acquire, transmit, and process the information from 
the IoT end-nodes (such as RFID devices, sensors, gateway, intelligent devices, etc.) via 
network to accomplish highly complex tasks. The IoT should be able to provide 
applications with strong security protection (for example, for online payment 
application, the IoT should be able to protect the integrity of payment information). 
The system architecture must provide operational guarantees for the IoT, which bridges 
the gap between the physical devices and the virtual worlds. In designing the framework 
of IoT, following factors should be taken into consideration: (1) Technical factors, such 
as sensing techniques, communication methods, network technologies, etc.; (2) security 
protection, such as information confidentiality, transmission security, privacy 
protection, etc.; (3) business issues, such as business models, business processes, etc. In 
current, the service-oriented architecture has been successfully applied to IoT design, 
where the applications are moving towards service-oriented integration technologies. In 
business domain, the complex applications among diverse services have been 
appearing. Services reside in different layers of the IoT such as: sensing layer, network 
layer, services layer, and application-interface layer. The services based application will 
heavily depend on the architecture of IoT. Fig.2 depicts a generic service-oriented 
architecture for IoT, which consists of four layers: 
 Sensing layer is integrated with end components of IoT to sense and acquire the 
information of devices; 
 Network layer is the infrastructure to support wireless or wired connections among 
things; 
  
 Service layer is to provide and management services required by users or 
applications; 
 Application-interfaces layer consists of interaction methods with users or 
applications. 
 
Figure 2. Service-oriented architecture for IoT [62] 
The security requirements on each layer might be different due to its features. In 
general, the security solution for the IoT considers following requirements: (1) sensing-
layer and IoT end-node security requirements, (2) network-layer security requirements, 
(3) service-layer security requirements, (4) application-interface-layer security 
requirements, (5) the security requirements between layers, and (6) security 
requirements for services running and maintenance. 
2.1 Sensing Layer and IoT end-nodes 
The IoT is a multilayer network that inter-connects devices for information acquisition, 
exchange, and processing. At the sensing layer, the intelligent tags and sensor networks 
are able to automatically sense the environment and exchange data among devices [61]. 
In determining the sensing layer of an IoT, the main concerns are: 
 Cost, size, resource, and energy consumption. The things might be equipped with 
sensing devices such as RFID tags, sensors, actuator, etc., which should be 
designed to minimize required resources as well as cost. 
  
 Deployment. The IoT end-nodes (such as RFID reader, tags, sensors, etc.) can be 
deployed one-time, or in incremental or random ways depending on application 
requirements. 
 Heterogeneity. A variety of things or hybrid networks make the IoT very 
heterogeneous. 
 Communication. The IoT end-nodes should be designed able to communicate each 
other. 
 Networks. The IoT involves hybrid networks, such as WSNs, WMNs, and SCADA 
systems. 
The security is an important concern in sensing-layer. It is expected that IoT could be 
connected with industrial networks to provide users smart services. However, it may 
cause new concerns in devices controlling, such as who can input authentication 
credentials or decide whether an application should be trusted. The security model in 
IoT must be able to make its own judgements and decision about whether to accept a 
command or execute a task. At sensing-layer, the devices are designed for low power 
consumption with constraints resources, which often have limited connectivity. The 
endless variety of IoT applications poses an equally wide variety of security challenges.  
 Devices authentication 
 Trusted devices 
 Leveraging the security controls and availability of infrastructures in sensing-
layer. 
 In terms of software update, how the sensing devices receive software updates or 
security patches in a timely manner without impairing functional safety or 
  
incurring significant recertification costs every time a patch is rolled out. 
In this layer, the security concerns can be classified into two main categories: 
 The security requirements at IoT end-node: physically security protection, 
access control, authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and privacy. 
 The security requirements in sensing-layer: confidentiality, data source 
authentication, device authentication, integrity, availability, and timeless etc.  
Table.2 summarizes the potential security threats and security vulnerabilities at IoT end-
node and Table.3 analyses the security threats and vulnerabilities in sensing layer.  
Table 2 Security threats and vulnerabilities at IoT end-node 
Security threats  Description 
Unauthorized access  Due to physically capture or logic attacked, the sensitive information at 
the end-nodes is captured by the attacker; 
Availability  The end-node stops to work since physically captured or attacked 
logically; 
Spoofing attack With malware node, the attacker successfully masquerades as IoT end-
device, end-node, or end-gateway by falsifying data 
  
Selfish threat Some IoT end-nodes stop working to save resources or bandwidth to 
cause the failure of network 
Malicious code Virus, Trojan, and junk message that can cause software failure  
Denial of Services (DoS) An attempt to make a IoT end-node resource unavailable to its users 
Transmission threats Threats in transmission, such as interrupting, blocking, data 
manipulation, forgery, etc. 
Routing attack  Attacks on a routing path 
 
Table 3 Analysis of the security threats and vulnerabilities in sensing layer 
IoT end-node threats  
and vulnerabilities 
IoT end-devices IoT end-node IoT end-gateway 
Unauthorized access     
Selfish threat     
Spoofing attack     
Malicious code    
Denial of Services (DoS)    
Transmission threats      
Routing attack    
To secure devices in this layer before users are at risk, following actions should be 
taken: (1) Implement security standards for IoT and ensure all devices are 
produced by meeting specific security standards; (2) Build trustworthy data 
sensing system and review the security of all devices/components; (3) 
  
Forensically identify and trace the source of users; (4) Software or firmware at 
IoT end-node should be securely designed. 
2.2 Network Layer  
The network layer connects all things in IoT and allows them aware of their 
surroundings. It is capable of aggregating data from existing IT infrastructures and then 
transmits to other layers, such as sensing layer, service layers, etc. The IoT connects a 
verity of different networks, which may cause a lot of difficulties on network problems, 
security problems, and communication problems.  
The deployment, management, and scheduling of networks are essential for the network 
layer in IoT. This enables devices to perform tasks collaboratively. In the networking 
layer, the following issues should be addressed: 
 Network management technologies including the management for fixed, 
wireless, mobile networks 
 Network energy efficiency 
   Requirements of QoS  
   Technologies for mining and searching  
   Information confidentiality 
   Security and privacy 
Among these issues, information confidentiality and human privacy security are critical 
because of its deployment, mobility, and complexity. The existing network security 
technologies can provide a basis for privacy and security protection in IoT, but more 
works still need to do. The security requirements in network layer involve: 
  
 Overall security requirements, including confidentiality, integrity, privacy 
protection, authentication, group authentication, keys protection, availability, 
etc. 
 Privacy leakage. Since some IoT devices physically located in untrusted places, 
which cause potential risks for attackers to physically find the privacy 
information such as user identification, etc.  
 Communication security.  It involves the integrity and confidentiality of 
signalling in IoT communications.  
 Overconnected. The overconnected IoT may run risk of losing control of the 
user. Two security concerns may be caused: (1) DoS attack, the bandwidth 
required by signalling authentication can cause network congestion and further 
cause DoS; (2) Keys security, for the overconnected network, the keys 
operations could cause heavy network resources consumption. 
 MITM attack, the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and 
relays messages between them, making them believe that they are talking 
directly to each other over a private connection, when in fact the attacker 
controls the entire conversation. 
 Fake network message, attackers could create fake signalling to isolate/mis-
operate the devices from the IoT. 
In the network-layer, the possible security threats are summarized in Table. 4 and Table 
5, the potential security threats and vulnerabilities are analysed.  
Table 4 Security threats in network layer 
Security threats  Description 
Data breach  Information release of secure information to an untrusted 
  
environment 
Transmission threats  The integrity and confidentiality of signaling,  
Denial of Services (DoS) An attempt to make a IoT end-node resource unavailable to its 
users 
Public key and private key The comprise of keys in networks 
Malicious code Virus, Trojan, and junk message that can cause software failure  
Denial of Services (DoS) An attempt to make a IoT end-node resource unavailable to its 
users 
Transmission threats Threats in transmission, such as interrupting, blocking, data 
manipulation, forgery, etc. 
Routing attack  Attacks on a routing path 
 
Table 5 The security threats and vulnerabilities in network layer 
 Privacy 
leakage 
Confidentiality Integrity DoS PKI MITM Request 
Forgery 
Physically protection         
Transmission Security        
Overconnected        
Cross-layer fusion        
The network infrastructure and protocols developed for IoT are different with 
existing IP network, special efforts are needed on following security concerns: (1) 
Authentication/Authorization, which involves vulnerabilities such as password, 
access control, etc.; (2) Secure transport encryption, it is crucial to encrypt the 
transmission in this layer. 
 
2.3 Service layer  
In IoT, the service layer relies on middleware technology, which is an important enabler 
of services and applications. The service layer provides IoT a cost-effective platform 
where the hardware and software platforms could be reused. The IoT illustrates the 
activities required by the middle service specifications, which are undertaken by various 
standards developed by the service providers and organizations. The service layer is 
designed based on the common requirements of applications, application programming 
interfaces (APIs), and service protocols. The core set of services in this layer might 
include following components: event processing service, integration services, analytics 
services, UI services, and security and management services [3]. The activities in 
service layer, such as information exchange, data processing, ontologies databases, 
communications between services, are conducted by following components: 
  
 Service discovery. It finds infrastructure can provide the required service and 
information in an effective way. 
 Service composition. It enables the combination and interaction among connected 
things. Discovery exploits the relationships of things to find the desired service, and 
service composition schedules or re-creates more suitable services to obtain the 
most reliable ones. 
 Trustworthiness management. It aims at understanding how the trusted devices and 
information provided by other services. 
 Service APIs. It provides the interactions between services required by users. 
In recent, a number of service layer solutions have been reported. The SOCRADES 
integration architecture (SIA) is proposed that can be used to interact between 
applications and service layers effectively [8]; things are abstracted as devices to 
provide services at low-levels as network discovery services, metadata exchange 
services, and asynchronous publish and subscribe event in [30, 46]; In [42], a 
representational state transfer (REST) is defined to increase interoperability between 
loosely coupled services and distributed applications. In [20], the services layer 
introduced a service provisioning process (SPP) that can provide the interaction 
between applications and services. It is important to design an effective security strategy 
to protect services against attacks in the service layer. The security requirements in the 
service layer include: 
 Authorization, service authentication, group authentication, privacy protection, 
integrity, integrity, security of keys, non-repudiation, anti-replay, availability, 
etc. 
 Privacy leakage. The main concern in this layer involves privacy leakage and 
  
malicious location tracking. 
 Service abuses, in IoT the service abuse attack involves: (i) illegal abuse of 
services; (ii) abuse of unsubscribed services;  
 Node identify masquerade. 
 DoS attack, Denial of service. 
 Replay attack, the attacker resend the data.  
 Service information sniffer and manipulation.  
 Repudiation in service layer, it includes the communication repudiation and 
services repudiation. 
The security solution should be able to protect the operations on this layer from 
potential threats. Table 6 summarizes the security threats on the service layer. 
Table 6 The security threats in service layer 
Security threats  Description 
Privacy threats  Privacy leakage or malicious location tracking 
Services abuse Unauthorized uses access services or the authorized users 
access unsubscribed services 
Identity masquerade  The IoT end-device, node, or gateway are masqueraded by 
attacker 
Service information 
manipulation 
The information in services is manipulated by the attacker 
Repudiation Denial the operations have been done 
Denial of Services (DoS) An attempt to make a IoT end-node resource unavailable to its 
users 
Replay attack The attack re-send the information to spoof the receiver 
Routing attack  Attacks on a routing path 
  
Ensure the data in service layer secure is crucial but difficult. It involves 
fragmented, full of competing standards and proprietary solutions. The service 
oriented architecture (SoA) is very helpful to improve the security of this layer, 
but following challenges still need to be faced when building an IoT services or 
application: (1) data transmission security between service and/or layers; (2) 
secure services management, such as service identification, access control, 
services composite, etc.  
  
2.4 Application-interface Layer 
The application-interface layer involves a variety of applications interfaces from RFID 
tag tracking to smart home, which are implemented by standard protocols as well as 
service-composition technologies [64]. The requirements in application-interface layer 
strongly depend the applications. For the application maintenance, following security 
requirements will be involved: 
 Remote safe configuration, software downloading and updating, security 
patches, administrator authentication, unified security platform, etc. 
For the security requirements on communications between layers,  
 Integrity and confidentiality for transmission between layers, cross-layer 
authentication and authorization, sensitive information isolation, etc. 
In IoT designing the security solutions, following rules should be helpful: 
a) Since most constrained IoT end-node works with an unattended manner, the 
designer should pay more attention to the safety of these nodes; 
b) Due to IoT involves billions of clustering nodes, the security solutions 
should be designed based on energy efficiency schemes;  
  
c) The light security scheme at IoT end-nodes might be different with existing 
network security solutions, however we should design security solutions in a 
big enough range for all parts in IoT. 
Table 7 summarizes the security threats and vulnerabilities in IoT application-interface 
layer. 
Table 7 The security threats in application-interface layer 
Security threats  Description 
Remote configuration  Fail to configure at interfaces 
Misconfiguration Mis-configuration at remote IoT end-node, end-device, or end-
gateway 
Security management Log and Keys leakage  
Management system  Failure of management system 
 
In Table 8, we analyse the security threats and potential vulnerabilities in application-
interface layer.  
Table 8 shows the security threats and vulnerabilities in Application-interface layer  
 Unauthorized 
access 
Failure of 
node 
Masquerade Selfish 
node 
Trojan, virus, 
spam 
Privacy 
leakage 
Physically security 
protection  
      
Anti-virus, 
firewalling 
      
Access Control       
Confidential       
Data Integrity       
Availability       
Authentication       
Non-Repudiation       
The application-interface layer bridges the IoT system with user applications, 
which should be able to ensure that the interaction of IoT systems with other 
applications or users are legal and can be trusted.   
2.5 Cross-layer Threats 
Information in the IoT architecture might be shared among all of the four layers to 
achieve full interoperability between services and devices. It brings a number of 
security challenges such as trust guarantee, privacy of the users and their date, secure 
data sharing among layers, etc. In the IoT architecture described in Fig.2, information is 
  
exchanged between different layers, which may cause potential threats as shown in 
Table. 9 
Table 9 Security threats between layers in the IoT architecture 
Security threats  Description 
Sensitive information Leakage at border  The sensitive information might be not protected 
at the border of layers.  
Identity spoofing The identities in different layers have different 
priorities.  
Sensitive information spreads between 
layers  
Sensitive information spreads at different layers 
and cause information leakage 
The security requirements in this layer include (1) security protection, securing to 
be ensured at design and execution time; (2) privacy protection, personal 
information access within IoT system, privacy standards and enhancement 
technologies; (3) trust has to be a part of IoT architecture and must be built in.  
2.6 Threats caused in maintenance of IoT  
The maintenance of IoT can cause security problems, such as in configuration of the 
network, security management, and application managements. Table.10 summarized the 
potential threats that can cause risky in IoT.  
Table 10 Security threats between layers in the IoT architecture 
Security threats  Description 
Remote configuration  Fail to configure remote IoT end-node, end-device, or end-gateway 
Misconfiguration Mis-configuration at remote IoT end-node, end-device, or end-gateway 
Security management Log and Keys leakage at IoT end-node 
Management system  Failure of management system 
3 Security in Enabling Technologies 
3.1 Security in Identification and Tracking Technologies 
The concept of IoT was coined based on the RFID-enabled identification and tracking 
technologies. A basic RFID system consists of an RFID reader and RFID tags. Due to 
its capability for identifying, tracing, and tracking, the RFID system has been widely 
applied in logistics, such as package tracking, supply chain management, healthcare 
applications, etc. A RFID system could provide sufficient real-time information about 
  
things in IoT, which are very useful to manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. For 
example, RFID application in supply chain management can improve backroom 
inventory-management practices.  
Although RFID technology is successfully used in many areas, it is still evolving in 
developing active system, Inkjet-printing based RFID, and management technologies in 
[19]. For adoption by the IoT, more identified problems need to be resolved, such as: 
collision of RFID readings, signal interferences, privacy protection, standardization, 
integration, etc. 
In the new era of IoT, the scope of identifications has expended and included RFIDs, 
Barcodes, and other intelligent sensing technologies. In RFID-enable contactless 
technologies (ISO 14443 and 15693), security features have been implemented, such as 
cryptographic challenge-response authentication, 128-bit AES, triple-DES, and SHA-2 
algorithms.  The increasingly use of RFID devices requires the RFID security guarantee 
from multiple sides: manufacture, privacy protection, business processes.  In general the 
security features of RFID includes:  
 Tags/Readers collision problem 
 Data confidentiality 
 Tag-to-reader authentication 
 High-assurance readers 
Table 11 summarizes the security features of RFID standards.  
Table 11 Security features in RFID standards  
            Security  
RFID\  
Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
EPC Class 0/0+     
EPC Class 1 G1     
EPC Class 1 G2    
ISO/IEC 18000-2     
ISO/IEC 18000-3    
ISO/IEC 11784/5     
ISO/IEC 15693    
  
Non-Repudiation    
 
In RFID technologies, the security and privacy protection are not just technical issues; 
important policy questions arise as RFID tags join to create large sensor networks.   
3.2 Security in Integration of WSN and RFID 
The integration of wireless sensors and RFID empowers IoT in the implementation of 
industrial services and the further deployment of services in extended applications. IoT 
with the integration of RIFD and WSNs make it possible to develop IoT applications for 
healthcare, decision-making of complex systems, and smart civic systems such as smart 
transport, cities or water supply systems.  
The security issue in integration of RFID and WSNs involves following challenges:  
 Privacy, it involves the privacy of RFID devices and WSNs devices, 
 Identification and authentication, the identification has to be protected from 
tracking by unauthorized user in the network.  
 Communication security, the communication between RFID devices and IoT 
devices poses security threats, which need to be addressed proactively, and 
appropriate measures must be implemented well.  
 Trust and ownership, trust implies the authenticity and integrity of the 
communication parts such as sensor nodes and RFID tags. 
 Integration 
 User authentication 
3.3 Security in Communications  
In IoT things are connected together in network access layer through different 
communication technologies. The IoT can be seen as an aggregation of heterogeneous 
  
networks, such as WSNs, wireless mesh networks, mobile networks, RFID systems, and 
WLAN. The communications between things/networks are essential to make reliable 
information exchange, which requires the IoT to provide secure, reliable, and scalable 
connections. IoT would also greatly benefit from the existing communication protocols 
in Internet such as IPv6, as this address any number of things needed through the 
Internet directly [43].  The basic principles of secure communications in IoT include: 
authentication, availability, confidentiality, and integrity. The limit of resources of 
things makes it difficult to build a secure enough for IoT; however, the IoT 
communication systems have to be designed to provide ‘secure enough’ by finding the 
right balance between effort and benefit of protection measures. The security solution 
for communications should be designed high enough to force the hackers give up before 
they succeed. The commonly used communication protocols and the potential security 
features include: 
 RFID (e.g. ISO 18000 6c EPC class 1 Gen2), the security features include 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The security features for different 
standards can be found in Table .10. 
 NFC, IEEE 802.11 (WLAN), IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.15.1(Bluetooth), in 
these wireless communication technologies, following security are needed: 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability, and detection malicious 
intrusion.  
 IETF Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN). Since 
6LoWPAN is a combination of IEEE 802.15.4 and IPv6, which may cause 
potential vulnerabilities from the two sides that target all layers of the stack:  
Table 12 Security features in 6LoWPAN 
Layers  Main potential attacks 
Application Layer Overwhele attack, path-based DoS attack 
Transport Layer Flooding attack 
  
Network Layer Malicious node attack; Sybil attack; Wormhole attack, Spoofing attack, and 
routing attack, etc. 
Adaption Layer Packets fragmentation attack; 
Link Layer Exhaustion attack, collision attack; interrogation attack; 
Physical Layer Tampering attack, etc. 
 
 Machine-to-Machine (M2M), tradition disruptive attacks in M2M such as DoS 
could have new consequences in M2M.  
 Traditional IP technologies, such as IP, IPv6, etc.  IPv4, secure every device, 
addresses nearing exhaustion, networks simple won’t have enough addresses to 
assign to the explosion of devices unless they transition to IPv6. However, for 
IPv6 it could have further vulnerabilities that haven’t been discovered.  In 
IPv6, IPsec could provide authenticity and integrity with authentication header, 
and the Encapsulated security payload provides confidentiality. In recent, the 
transport layer security (TLS) is developed as an alternative to IPsec to provide 
mutual authentication of two parties using public key infrastructures and X.509 
certificates [70]. 
 Key Management in IoT. Many key management systems (KMSs) have been 
proposed in recent. In IoT, the KMS should be designed based on standard 
protocols. The IPsec applies the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) for automatic 
key management. For IEEE 802.15.4, no key management system is defined 
but in [71], a lightweight key management IKEv2 is proposed for 6LoWPAN 
IPsec and IEEE 802.15.4.  
3.4 Security in Networks  
The IoT is a hybrid network that involves a lot of heterogeneous networks, which 
requires multi-faceted security solutions to against network intrusions and disruptions. 
The IoT contains networks that connected with daily used devices, such as smartphones, 
surveillance cameras, home appliances, etc. Support for heterogeneous networks can 
  
help IoT to connect the devices with different communication specification, QoS 
requirements, functionalities, and goals. On the other hand, support for heterogeneity 
can reduce the cost to implement IoT by well integrating diversified things.  Meanwhile, 
some of the existing networking technologies such as architecture, protocols, network 
management, security schemes, can be directly applicable in an IoT context.  The 
networks involved in IoT are core parts of security working, and each sub-network is 
required to provide confidentiality, secure communication, encryption certificates and 
that sort of things. In IoT no IDS and IPS are specifically designed yet, but many 
watchdog-based IDS and IPSs could be used in the context of IoT.   
3.5 Security in Service Management  
Service management refers to the implementation and management of the services that 
meet the needs of users or applications. Security solution at service layer is designed 
specifically in the context of the services. For services such as consumer applications, 
logistical, surveillance, intelligent healthcare, the security concerns have some 
similarities: authentication, access control, privacy, integrity of information, certificates 
and PKI certificates, digital signature and non-repudiation, etc. For different services, 
the security concerns might be specifically designed depends the service feature, 
scenarios, and special requirements, etc.   
4 Security Concerns in IoT Applications  
The IoT enables information gathering, transmitting, and storing be available for 
devices in many scenarios, which creates or accelerates many applications such as 
industrial control systems, retailing industry, smart shelf operations, healthcare, food 
and restaurant industry, logistic industry, travel and tourism industry, library 
applications, etc. It can also be foreseen that the IoT will greatly contribute to address 
  
the important issues such as business model, healthcare monitoring systems, daily living 
monitoring, and traffic congestion control. 
For applications in IoT, security and privacy are two important challenges. To integrate 
the devices of sensing layer as intrinsic parts of the IoT, effective security technology is 
essential to ensure security and privacy protection in various activities such as personal 
activities, business processes, transportations, and information protection. In this 
section, we will focus on following five typical applications to address the potential 
security challenges.  
4.1 Security Concerns in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems  
SCADA systems are generally designed as more technical-oriented solutions often in 
the industrial environment with the sole intent to monitor processes without considering 
the security requirements and the needs to protect them from external threats. The 
SCADA systems are believed to play a huge role in industrial applications of IoT [94]. 
A SCADA could contain multiple elements: supervisory systems, programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs), human-machine interface (HMI), remote machine telemetry units 
(RTUs), communication infrastructure, and various process and analytical 
instrumentation. From a security viewpoint, an attacker could target each of the above 
elements to compromise a SCADA system. In order to ensure the integration of 
SCADA systems into IoT, secure SCADA protocols should be designed to be able to 
connect with IoT environments. However this could raise the following security 
concerns [95, 96, 97]: 
 Authentication and access control. To ensure secure communication, strong 
authentication must be implemented to allow access to main functionalities; On 
  
the other hand, authenticating and access control can well identify and assess the 
information sources. 
 Identification of SCADS vulnerabilities. It is important to implement proper 
countermeasures and take corrective actions as appropriate. The software in 
SCADA should be regularly updated to tackle the security vulnerabilities.  
 Physical security. In SCADAs, physical security protection must be carefully 
evaluated for each component and each component is recommended to meet 
NIST FIPS standards. 
 System recovery and backups. The SCADAs should be designed to be able to 
rapidly recover from disaster or compromised status. 
4.2 Security concerns in Enterprise information systems  
Most companies have fulfilled their missions of installing enterprise information 
systems within the companies in the last two decades. These enterprise information 
systems have played the pivotal role in modern organizations existing as Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) systems which integrated intra-organizational business 
processes, supply chain management systems that link inter-organizational business 
processes, and Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems that maintain 
relationships with customers [101]. Although the direct financial benefits and business 
performance of enterprise systems usage are still in controversy according to a series of 
studies conducted to investigate the enterprise system usage and organizational 
performance [103, 104, 105], most of them reported that enterprise systems usage cause 
positive impact on organizational operations by improving decision making processes, 
and most importantly, integrating information and resources of an organization into one 
system. Centralizing information and resources is thus identified as the most important 
factor for adopting enterprise systems. Looking back historically, it’s the technology 
  
innovation that moves the enterprise systems wave forward. The increasing processing 
power of servers and PCs in the last two decades has enabled the client/server 
architecture for enterprise systems. It could be foreseen that the increased processing 
power will shift to small embedded-devices such as RFID tags, which could be widely 
implemented in many physical objects, leading to the new type of IOT enabled 
enterprise systems. The new IoT enabled enterprise systems extend the current systems 
and could gather more integrated data and information, bringing the security challenges 
to a new level.  As most enterprise systems are installed inside organizations’ intranets, 
the traditional security issues for enterprise systems mainly involve the identification 
process for users to access the system [105]. However, the IoT enabled enterprise 
systems incorporate sensors into the enterprise systems and will involve more security 
challenges than the traditional enterprise systems because the data and information 
carried by the sensors might go beyond the enterprise system physically. For example, 
the collaborative warehouse implemented with the IoT technology gather data from the 
warehouse outside the ERP system and communicates with the ERP systems through 
different protocols [106].  This new architecture of enterprise systems require the 
security concerns to focus more on the sensor layer as well as the middleware layer 
because both there might be issues of data breach at these layers. For the application 
layer where the IoT applications might interact with the enterprise systems, special 
attention shall be given to identity authentication and application architecture because 
this layer is more vulnerable than other layers.   
4.3 Security concerns in Social IoT  
Social IoT is the spread and diffusion of IoT applications into societal level. Similarly to 
the socialization of many other technologies, IoT played an important role at the 
societal level. It will influence every part of our life from entertainment to energy usage. 
  
For example, wearable devices such as google glasses will be very popular in the 
foreseeable future and the popular UP wristband by Jawbone has proven how popular 
the wearable devices could be. Other applications such as smart TV, smart meter, and 
smart home devices all implying a new digital world enabled by IoT is coming. IoT will 
make our worlds more connected as the connected car and many other connected 
devices are on the road [99]. However, IoT technology alone won’t be able to fulfil the 
task rather, other technologies have to be considered together to function as an 
integrated process.  Social media and mobile APPs all played key role in this 
socialization of IoT part.  In the future, we could see us all connected through social 
networks and social IoT devices. Security would be an essential part for the social IoT. 
As we are entering a new digital world enabled by the IoT, security issues in this digital 
world are a new challenge compared to the previous internet security. Previous internet 
security mainly focuses on the security protocols, antivirus software implementation, 
and firewalls etc. The Social IoT security shall has some similarity to the internet 
security in that they both shall have the security protocols but the social IoT security 
might involve more complex issues because the social IoT needs to integrate the 
heterogynous devices together. How to manage the interactions among all these 
heterogynous devices become the top issue for the social IoT security. Data and 
information communicated over the IoT network need to be managed through a reliable 
framework. Ethical issues such as privacy, data access right, the degree of openness of 
data will all influence how the security architecture for social IoT to be constructed. 
When more and more devices are connected together, the traffic of data over the social 
IoT will also become a big issue. How to effectively design the traffic so that data over 
social IoT could be transferred securely in a reliable way will also become challenging. 
4.4 Confidentiality and security for IoT based Healthcare  
  
The IoT motives eHealthcare and mobile healthcare integrated into IoT based 
Healthcare, which covers traditional internet-enabled healthcare applications (such as e-
Pharmacy, e-Care, mobile healthcare, etc.). Similar to the social IoT Security, the 
healthcare IoT security will involve integration of multi-source data and information 
distributed over both the internet and evolving IoT.  As the healthcare is a highly 
sensitive yet personal area dealing with much private information from patients, 
especially the vulnerable group of people, the security design shall be paid more 
attention than many other IoT networks.  For this reason, data confidentiality and data 
security might emerge as the most important two factors to be considered when design 
the healthcare security architecture. Other factors such as reliability (anti-hacker, anti-
virus, etc), design issues (such as signature, authentication, etc.), and compliance issues 
shall also be carefully considered. In addition to the previous factors, ealthcare security 
is different from other industries, which features: 
 Not bilateral condition; 
 Regulated; 
 Community interested; 
 Legal issues 
For these reasons, the design of the healthcare security system shall adopt a more 
reliable approach. The current healthcare-specific security standards include following 
four parts: 
 Authentication, identification, signature, non-reputation 
 Data integrity, encryption, data integrity process, permanence 
 System security, communication, processing, storage, permanence 
 Internet security, personal health records, secures Internet services. 
In IoT-based healthcare system, the security issues include: 
  
 Security for patient confidentiality 
 Security that enables electronic health records (authentication, data integrity) 
 Transmission security,  
 Security in healthcare data access, processing, storage, etc. 
5 Summary 
Security at both the physical devices and service-applications is critical to the operation 
of IoT, which is indispensable for the success of IoT. Open problems remain in a 
number of areas, such as security and privacy protection, network protocols, 
standardisation, identity management, trusted architecture, etc. In this paper, we analyse 
the security requirements and potential threats in a four-layer architecture, in terms of 
general devices security, communication security, network security, and application 
security. The security challenges in enabling technologies of IoT also are reviewed. In 
future research, the security strategies for IoT should be carefully designed by managing 
the tradeoffs among security, privacy, and utility to provide security in multi-layer 
architecture of IoT.  
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